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The Polis and the Res Publica: Two Arendtian Models of Violence1 
ABSTRACT: The influence of the ancient Greek world on Hannah Arendt's 
thought is well-documented, yet her interest in the politics of the Roman 
Republic is often considered less central to her work. This paper explores 
Arendt's analysis of both these political worlds, with a particular emphasis on 
what this comparison can tells us about her understanding of the role of violence 
in politics. Arendt has generally been understood to structurally exclude 
violence from the political, in part due to the claims she makes in her later essay 
‘On Violence.’ Yet in her portrayal of Roman politics, and her preference for 
this political system above the Greeks’ (in certain respects), a genuinely 
political engagement with violence can be discerned. The paper claims that this 
particular case study indicates the framework of the vita activa, set out by 
Arendt in The Human Condition, should be reinterpreted, particularly insofar as 
‘fabrication’ or ‘work’ here appears as something that is legitimately part of the 
political, and incorporates within it some forms of violence. The claims that 
violence is structurally anti-political, this paper concludes, are temporally 
specific to a twentieth century context, rather than constituting a foundational 
‘rule’ of political practice for Arendt.  
 
1 
 
The influence of the Greek world on Hannah Arendt’s thought is evident in her 
characterisation of ‘action,’ an agonal practice at the very core of her notion of the political. 
Her extensive use of Greek political terms and references to Greek politics in The Human 
Condition in particular, and in her work more broadly, has resulted in a broad consensus 
within the literature that Arendt’s developed political thought uses Greece as a political 
                                                             
1 Many thanks to those who have offered valuable feedback or suggestions on this paper, including 
Duncan Kelly, Guy Paltieli, Chris Brooke, Paul Cartledge, Christopher Meckstroth, and the attendees 
of the Cambridge History of Political Thought seminar where this paper was first presented.  
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exemplar.2 It has also been the focus of many critics of Arendt’s work. Yet this assumption is 
problematic because it reduces ‘the political’ to the single dimension of agonistic action, 
whereas, I will argue, Arendt’s criticisms of Greek politics, alongside her use of other, 
radically contrasting, political examples, offer an alternative image of the political sphere.  
 
In particular, this paper will claim that Arendt’s understanding of the Roman Republic 
is an equally important narrative in her work and that our understanding of politics in 
Arendt’s work should be revised accordingly. This paper will focus on the contrast between 
the political use of violence in these two worlds, as portrayed, (with, at times, doubtful 
historical accuracy) by Arendt. She is often believed to have wholly excluded violence from 
politics, in its proper form. Her 1969 essay ‘On Violence’ is the most categorical formulation 
of her stance on political violence, where she explicitly opposes the ‘consensus from right to 
left to the effect that violence is nothing more than the most flagrant manifestation of 
power.’3 Whilst violence is merely strength, multiplied by tools, and thereby accumulated in 
the hands of the few, power is the ability of the many to act in concert, and it is this 
participatory power that fundamentally drives politics, Arendt believes. ‘All political 
institutions are manifestations of power,’ she writes, ‘they petrify and decay as soon as the 
living power of the people ceases to uphold them.’4 The ‘muteness’ of violence is contrasted 
with the discourse of power, and the instrumentality of violence opposed to the intrinsic value 
that only free, public action can bear.5 Thus, ‘in so far as violence plays a predominant role in 
wars and revolutions,’ Arendt states, ‘both occur outside the political realm, strictly speaking, 
in spite of their enormous role in recorded history.’6  
                                                             
2 This consensus covers a broad range of interpretations however, as will be explored in this article.  
3 Hannah Arendt, ‘On Violence,’ in Crises of the Republic (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
1969), 134. 
4 Ibid, 140. 
5 Ibid, 145. 
6 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (London: Penguin Books, 1965), 19. 
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Arendt’s portrayal of the Greek polis as a space which categorically excluded 
violence from the political sphere can be seen as either the root of these claims, or a key 
exemplar of the political, as it exists in its fullest form.7 However, in her outline of the 
Roman understanding of the relationship between violence and politics, which is in certain 
respects diametrically opposed to the Greek conceptualisation, she is no less admiring, 
considering it, in fact, to be an important feature of the Romans’ more pragmatic and 
sustainable politics. Thus, as this paper will seek to show, Arendt’s work on Rome offers 
another way into understanding the relationship between violence and politics which enables 
an engagement between violence and the political. It focuses on the comparison between 
Greek and Roman politics as an example of how, in her depiction of political practice, a 
different realisation of the relationship between politics and violence emerges to the highly 
abstract conceptualisation offered in ‘On Violence.’8 But although this is just one example 
from Arendt’s vast oeuvre, it is particularly illuminating on the question of how in reality 
violence and politics meet, and an example which forces us to reconsider Arendt’s idea of 
violence in the political sphere in a broader sense.  
 
                                                             
7 The term ‘Greece’ in this paper follows Arendt’s rather vague usage, referring to the Greek city-
states of the ancient world broadly, but evidently predominantly drawing from the history of Athens, 
which she occasionally uses interchangeably with ‘Greece.’ This not only masks the wide variation 
between the over 100 city-states of ancient Greece, but tends to glaze over the development of 
democratic political culture within Athens itself, which changes radically over this period (a 
development she discusses at times, but which does not prevent her from identifying ‘Greece’ in the 
main as a unitary political culture.) 
8 Although ‘On Violence’ was written in the context of a very clear and particular set of violent 
threats to politics, not least the possibility of nuclear war, the actual description of violence she offers 
in this essay is quite divorced from the particular threats with which she was concerned. 
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This approach builds on the work of Patricia Owens, who has also convincingly 
written on the political relevance of war in Arendt’s work on Rome.9 She argues, in her 2009 
work Between War and Politics, that whilst violence (here, warfare) is outside the realm of 
politics, it is constitutively exterior, that is, violent engagements may positively influence the 
political space of action. This study develops this line of argument further, drawing on 
Arendt’s portrayal of the Roman Republic, but also offering a method by which to integrate 
Arendt’s writings on warfare with her writings on violence more broadly. I suggest that the 
existence of a legitimate engagement between political action and certain violent acts may be 
incorporated into the action/work/labour framework set out by Arendt in The Human 
Condition. Rather than segregating ‘action,’ and defining it as equivalent to politics – as the 
Greek model suggests – the Roman model Arendt outlines instead frames politics in broader 
terms. Specifically, the Roman model of politics based upon ‘tradition’ (in Arendt’s 
particular interpretation of that term) leads to a reframing of politics as an activity not simply 
of action, but also of ‘work.’ Conceptually, this enables instrumental and ‘speechless’ 
violence to enter into political relationships, otherwise excluded by a pure action-oriented 
interpretation of Arendt’s work. Whilst ‘On Violence’ positions violence outside the proper 
sphere of politics, strictly understood, it does not necessarily position violence against the 
political. This distinction belies a certain flexibility in the theoretical definition of violence 
that Arendt makes; creating a space in which a more politically oriented form of violence 
might be found. 
 
                                                             
9 Patricia Owens, Between War and Politics: International Relations and the Thought of Hannah 
Arendt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); ‘Hannah Arendt: Violence and the Inescapable Fact 
of Humanity,’ in Hannah Arendt and International Relations, ed. Anthony F. Lang and John Williams 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 41-65. 
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Yet, as David Bates’s 2010 article on Arendt’s work on war in the classical era amply 
illustrates, these readings of power must also be read as a response to the contemporary 
political context in which Arendt wrote, namely the post-war breakdown in political tradition, 
the changing nature of warfare itself in an atomic era, and the growing global influence and 
quasi-imperial tendencies of the United States. However, against Bates, I claim that the 
substantive differences in context do not necessarily undermine the relevance of the Roman 
approach to contemporary politics. Rather, it provides part of an alternative thread in 
Arendt’s work, one which is more open to certain possibilities for violence in, or at least for, 
politics, and thereby offers a more pragmatic and plausible political model.  
 
2 
 
Noel O’Sullivan, in his 1975 article on Arendt’s ‘Hellenic nostalgia,’ writes that the life of 
the Greek polis ‘constitutes the focal point of all her thought. Hellenism determines even her 
definition of politics.’10 Dana Villa agrees that ‘the politics of democratic Athens [was] 
transformed into something of an “ideal type” by Arendt.’11 Because of this, he writes, ‘The 
Human Condition mines ancient Greek poetry, drama, and philosophy in order to show how, 
in its original understanding, political action was viewed as the very opposite of violence, 
coercion or rule.’12 While Villa appeals to this ‘rescue of the intersubjective essence of 
political action’ as ‘Arendt’s primary contribution to political theory,’ others are more 
critical.13 The Athenian ‘idealisation’ of Athens serves as the basis for criticism of Arendt’s 
                                                             
10 Noel O’Sullivan, ‘Hannah Arendt: Hellenic Nostalgia and Industrial Society, in Contemporary 
Political Philosophers, ed. A. de Crespigny and K. Minogue (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 
1975), 229. 
11 Dana Villa, ‘Introduction,’ in The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, ed. Dana Villa 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 9. 
12 Ibid., 12. 
13 Dana Villa, ‘Beyond Good and Evil: Arendt, Nietzsche, and the Aestheticization of Political 
Action,’ Political Theory 20, no. 2 (1992): 274. 
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politics by O’Sullivan as well as Bhikhu Parekh, who claims that her Greek depiction of 
agonic action is problematically elitist, because only ‘the acts in which men begin something 
new are unusual enough to attract attention and deserve remembrance.’ And he further 
criticises Arendt for not paying attention to the ‘inescapable instrumental dimension’ of 
politics, ‘turning politics into a theatrical and somewhat pointless activity.’14  
 
Benhabib, meanwhile, identifies an irreconcilable tension between Arendt’s 
modernism and anti-modernism. ‘The unresolved contradictions in some of her formulations 
can be traced back to this twofold spiritual-intellectual legacy’ she argues, contrasting the 
‘persecuted Jew…the philosophical and political modernist,’ with the Heideggerian 
influenced ‘antimodernist Grecophile theorist of the polis.’15 Habermas, likewise, claims that 
many problems derive from Arendt’s commitment to ‘the historical and conceptual 
constellation of classical Greek philosophy.’16 Not least among these, he argues, is the 
instability of praxis, due to the ‘unimpaired subjectivity’ Arendt demands of political action; 
her exclusion of social issues; and a failure to engage with the relationship between state and 
economy.17   
 
As these examples show, what sets Greek politics apart for Arendt is a particular 
concept of ‘action’ emphasising the heroic and the agonal. This, Arendt believes, was the 
Greek solution to the unpredictability of human action and destiny.18 The Greek answer to the 
                                                             
14 Bhikhu Parekh, Hannah Arendt and the Search for a New Political Philosophy (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 1984), 118-9, 51. 
15 Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage 
Publications, 1996), 118. 
16 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Hannah Arendt’s Communications Concept of Power,’ Social Research 44, no. 
1 (1977): 7. 
17 Ibid., 11, 15. 
18 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 192. 
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vagaries of fortune, Arendt writes, was that, ‘whoever consciously aims at being “essential,” 
at leaving behind a story and an identity which will win “immortal fame,” must not only risk 
his life but expressly choose, as Achilles did, a short life and premature death.’19 This is 
because, only one ‘who does not survive his one supreme act remains the indisputable master 
of his identity and possible greatness, because he withdraws into death from the possible 
consequences.’20 Politics was the space in which this form of action might be realised, and 
thus the possibility of greatness. This attitude predates Greek democracy, Arendt believed, 
but it is this spirit that shaped Greek politics through to its decline in the 5th and 4th centuries 
BC. ‘This concept of action is highly individualistic,’ she writes, becoming ‘the prototype of 
action for Greek antiquity and influenced, in the form of the so-called agonal spirit, the 
passionate drive to show one’s self in measuring up against others that underlies the concept 
of politics prevalent in the city-states.’21  
 
Alongside the intensely individualistic ‘action’ of the hero, however, is a notion of 
power: the coming together of citizens in equal discussion in the public spaces of the polis. 
Isonomia, the Greek term for a free constitution, does not mean equality before the law, 
Arendt claims, ‘but merely that all have the same claim to political activity, and in the polis, 
this activity primarily took the form of speaking with one another. Isonomia is therefore 
essentially the equal right to speak, and as such is the same thing as isegoria.’22 Action as 
speech produces the shared perspective that enables power, and thus, politics. The two 
                                                             
19 Ibid., 193. 
20 Ibid., 193-4. 
21 Ibid., 194. 
22 The claim to equivalency between isonomia and isegoria is generally not accepted by historians, for 
whom isonomia, with its specific relation to equality under the law, is a more politically charged term, 
open to contestation through the question of whom, exactly, may be deemed ‘equal’ within the legal 
framework. Hannah Arendt, ‘Introduction into Politics,’ in The Promise of Politics, ed. Jerome Kohn, 
(New York: Schocken Books, 2005), 118. 
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connect in their shared reliance on discourse: to produce power, and to make action immortal 
through narrative.  
 
The prioritisation of ‘action’ understood in terms of an agonal process of discourse 
between equal citizens, whether understood as the ‘drive to show one’s self’ or the power that 
emerged through these exchanges of speech, marked out action as the distinctively political 
activity. In this agonal discourse, Arendt claims, the value of politics was to be found: the 
creating of intersubjective meaning between citizens. Political action was therefore not end-
oriented or consequentialist, but rather, the activity held intrinsic value. Yet this excludes two 
elements generally considered essential to politics: legislation, and violence. Both were 
understood as acts of ‘making,’ of exerting dominance over some subject to produce 
particular outcomes. Thus both were considered incompatible with the essential equality of 
the political sphere and the intrinsic value of its own practices. War, Arendt writes, is 
something that happened outside the polis. Legislation, meanwhile, is seen as pre-political, 
creating the space in which men might then act politically. ‘Before men began to act,’ she 
writes, ‘a definite space had to be secured and a structure built where all subsequent actions 
could take place, the space being the public realm of the polis and its structure the law.’23 
Yet, she continues, ‘the laws, like the walls around the city, were not results of action, but 
products of making.’24 
 
Arendt’s claim that Athens stands at the beginning of Western politics, and her use of 
Athens to illustrate fundamental political elements, including action, has led many to equate 
Arendt’s ideal politics with her depiction of the polis. But the ‘highly theatrical 
                                                             
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., 194-5. 
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individualism’ of the Greek polis does not define politics for Arendt.25 There is, alongside 
Arendt’s admiration for Greece, a critique of Greek politics, equally important in positioning 
‘action’ in Arendtian politics. As Margaret Canovan writes, ‘for all Arendt’s undoubted 
admiration for the Greeks, she did not regard Athens as a political model in any exclusive 
sense.’26 This critique clearly emerges in Arendt’s contrasting depiction of the politics of the 
Roman Republic. A comparison of Arendt’s work on Greece and Rome enables a more 
nuanced understanding of both, and indeed, her idea of politics itself. Greece, it will be 
argued, is ‘ideal’ only in certain highly abstracted senses, while Arendt’s praise of Roman 
political practice as that opposes key elements of Greek politics reveals her depiction of 
political practice to be much more complex. 
 
3 
 
Although the Greeks succeeded in positioning action at the centre of political life (where 
Arendt believes it should be), their politics was still flawed, in Arendt’s view.27 This is often 
missed by readers of her work, as Roy Tsao points out. ‘Throughout The Human Condition,’ 
Tsao writes, ‘Arendt deliberately – and systematically – attributes to the ancient Greeks a set 
of beliefs about the nature of politics that are at odds with her own theoretical claims in this 
same book.’28 Specifically, it is clear that Roman law (lex) is, for Arendt, superior to Greek 
law (nomos). Even Plato and Aristotle’s elevation of lawmaking in politics did not truly 
                                                             
25 Dana Villa, ‘Hannah Arendt: Modernity, Alienation, and Critique,’ in Hannah Arendt and the 
Meaning of Politics, ed. C. Calhoun and J. McGowan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1997), 193. 
26 Ibid., 115. 
27 Arendt’s criticism of the Greek polis, is independent of Arendt’s much more severe (and well-
understood) criticism of Greek philosophy, it should be stressed. 
28 Roy T. Tsao, ‘Arendt Against Athens: Rereading the Human Condition,’ Political Theory 30, no. 1 
(2002): 98.  
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comprehend the ‘political genius of Rome,’ writes Arendt, that is, the Romans’ particular 
idea of legislation and foundation.29 Rather, the philosophers suggested that men should 
renounce their capacity for action in favour of greater stability for the political body through 
fixed, unchanging legislation – a cure worse than the problem, Arendt believed.30  
 
Tsao claims that Roman lex was preferred by Arendt because the Greeks conflated action and 
‘making’ – a non-political activity – in their understanding of legislation as the firmly defined 
boundary of the political. However, the proper relationship between action and making in 
politics is far more complex, and I suggest rather that the problem may be summarised in the 
idea that the Greeks failed to adequately embody the realities of political action within the 
law.  
 
There are a number of inter-related elements to this claim. First, it is problematic, for 
Arendt, that nomos is characterised in terms of boundaries, rather than relationships, as lex 
was. The polis was pre-defined: before ‘action’ could be enacted, a supreme legislator was 
required to define the political space: territorially, legally, and demographically. Within a 
space thus cleared for politics, citizens could then talk and act in a political manner – politics 
therefore rested upon the distinctly prepolitical productive activity of the legislator. ‘The law 
is, so to speak, something by which the polis enters its political life, something it cannot 
abolish.’31 Greek law therefore ruled over men, rather than being a product of political action, 
and thus, the ‘extraordinary political fruitfulness of the Roman concept of law,’ is opposed to 
Greek nomos, ‘both father and despot in one.’32 The polis citizen was a ‘son and slave’ his 
                                                             
29 Arendt, The Human Condition, 195.  
30 Ibid. 
31 Arendt, ‘Introduction into Politics,’ 182. 
32 Arendt, ‘Introduction into Politics,’ 180, 182. 
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entire life, Arendt writes, ‘all feared the law of their polis every bit as much as the Persians 
feared their king.’33 Dean Hammer notes that for Arendt ‘the Roman conception of 
founding…points to a significant departure from a Greek conception precisely because 
founding is not seen as a “once-for-all” affair [but] as an incremental process.’34 In Rome, lex 
was an ongoing process, based upon traditional foundations reimagined for the present. Law 
appears as a form of rule in Greece, rather than an embodiment of action and an integrated 
aspect of the political as it did in Rome.  
 
Conceptually the Greek idea of ‘despotic’ law therefore stands in opposition to 
Arendt’s ideal of free action. But that the Greeks conceptualised politics in this manner had 
practical consequences and the second aspect of Arendt’s critique of nomos relates to this. 
Nomos, or law perceived as boundaries, was detrimental to the success of the polis because it 
prevented the Greeks from adapting as internal and external conditions changed. Hence the 
Athenians’ relationship with their colonies could never develop into a political relationship, 
but only ever be one of dominance – politics itself could not expand beyond its defined 
boundaries. So while Arendt praises the Greeks’ understanding of the priority of action within 
the political space, she notes that its excess of action was repressed by legal limitations. A 
chief reason, she writes, ‘for the incredible development of gift and genius in Athens…was 
precisely that from beginning to end its foremost aim was to make the extraordinary an 
ordinary occurrence of everyday life.’35 Yet this was just as responsible for ‘the hardly less 
surprising decline in the city-state.’36 While the polis was fixed by legislation, within these 
immovable boundaries, action itself – and specifically, the deeply heroic and individual form 
                                                             
33 Ibid., 182. 
34 Dean Hammer, ‘Hannah Arendt and Roman Political Thought: The Practice of Theory,’ Political 
Theory 30, no. 1 (2002): 130.  
35 Arendt, The Human Condition, 197. 
36 Ibid. 
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of action that was lauded in the Greek world – was irrepressible, and this conflict is identified 
by Arendt as a major factor in the decline of the polis.  
 
The third and final point I wish to highlight here, is that whilst this conflict posed 
problems, the Greek ideal of ‘heroic’ action was itself problematic for political stability. In 
her essay ‘Introduction into Politics,’ written around the same time as The Human Condition, 
Arendt explains why. Action, she writes, ‘can never occur in isolation, insofar as the person 
who begins something can embark upon it only after he has won over others to help him.’ In 
this sense, she continues, ‘all action is action “in concert”…that is, in the sense of the Greek 
verb prattein, to carry out and complete.’ This is the stage of action which ‘ultimately 
determines how human affairs turn out and how they appear, it is the most politically 
important stage.’ Action in concert is preceded by ‘the beginning, the archein [which] 
depends on an individual and his courage to embark upon an enterprise.’ Thus, Arendt 
concludes, ‘although all freedom would forfeit its best and deepest meaning without this 
freedom of spontaneity, the latter is itself prepolitical…spontaneity depends on 
organizational forms of life only to the extent that it is ultimately the world that can organize 
it.’37So, the form of action so highly prized in Greek politics was, although necessary for 
politics, in reality prepolitical. Yet the founding aim of Greek politics was to raise up this 
aspect of action, to ‘make the extraordinary an everyday occurrence.’38  
 
What resulted from this conjunction was both the genius and downfall of Athens. The 
utter boundlessness of the action which drove Athens forward, ultimately pulled it apart from 
the inside. On one side is the polis as a defined creation of the legislator, on the other, the 
                                                             
37 Arendt, ‘Introduction into Politics,’ 127-8. 
38 Arendt, The Human Condition, 197. 
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heroic individual continuously attempting to reshape the polis in their own mould – but 
without a means by which to constitutionally enact the (often much-needed) change. Constant 
attempts to introduce the new are enacted in opposition to the stability of the state, structured 
as it is. The missing link is power, that is, action as prattein or carrying through, as opposed 
to action as archein, or pure initiation, the necessary juncture between (individual) action and 
legislation. Prattein embodies the action of the group, rather than the prepolitical initiatory 
action of the individual into the group, and is thus, Arendt remarks, the most politically 
important form of action.39 But power is diminished both by Greek heroic action which 
disempowers the broader mass of the people, and by the constitutional limits of the state 
conceived as a pre-formed set of boundaries. Pursuing the extraordinary resulted in the 
remarkable achievements of Greek culture and politics, and their immortality over the 
millennia. But in political fact it also resulted in the collapse of the polis. The legislatively 
‘fixed’ state was unable to manage the action, conflict, and, ultimately, violence that 
increasingly infiltrated the political sphere itself as power was eroded. 
 
In making the claim that Arendt understood the polis as a great, but essentially 
flawed, political entity, I do not suggest that Athens was without importance in her work. Her 
criticism does not detract from her depiction of the Greek political system as a shining 
example of pure heroic action in the political sphere, but it does mean such a system is 
unstable, and unlikely to endure, particularly when conjoined with a rigid legislative 
framework. Not only did this system fail, moreover, Arendt believed it produced its own 
antithesis in the work of Plato and his successors, fostering the emergence of an anti-political 
prioritisation of contemplation. It is worth noting that Arendt herself recognises many of the 
problems with Athenian politics that her critics have identified with her notion of ‘politics.’ 
                                                             
39 Arendt, ‘Introduction into Politics,’ 127-8. 
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That she recognised and accepted the difficulties that inhere in the Greek idea of politics 
undermines the claim that Arendt’s politics is an idealisation of Greek politics. She did not, 
as Parekh suggests, adopt an individualistic, and elitist notion of politics from Athens, but 
rather identified this kind of action as not wholly political, strictly speaking, and as such, the 
root of fundamental problems in the polis.40 And the accusation which is often levelled at 
Arendt, of the ‘pointlessness’ or anti-instrumentality of the politics she depicts, is undermined 
by her portrayal of power: first as the truly political form of action, and secondly as the form 
of action which carries through, or which achieves a purpose.41 It points to power as an action 
that is not, as heroic action is, wholly untouched by consequence, but equally, which cannot 
be understood in the same way as the utilitarian logic of work, still less labour.  
 
Relationships of power (the prattein of action) have a binding force, and contingently 
sustain the living space of politics, but that space, as Athens shows, can deteriorate rapidly 
through the influence of internal or external change. Yet while power stabilises politics, a 
pure conception of politics as power and action remains to some degree unstable, because 
below power there is always the innately unpredictable existence of human freedom as 
action. ‘Unlike the spaces that are the works of our hands,’ she writes, the political space of 
appearance ‘does not survive the actuality of the movement which brought it into being, but 
disappears not only with the dispersal of men…but with the disappearance or arrest of the 
activities themselves.’42  
                                                             
40 This is not to suggest that Arendt’s politics does not show itself, in some respects, as elitist, but 
simply that Greek individualism is not the exclusive inspiration or model for this elitism. 
41 E.g. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, ‘Justice: On Relating Private and Public,’ Political Theory 9, no. 3 
(1981): 270. 
42 Arendt, The Human Condition, 199. 
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Yet, as Arendt makes clear, there is nothing natural or necessary about the existence of any 
particular polity; politics neither emerges, nor exists, ‘naturally,’ but must be created by men 
anew, or transmitted by the actions of men over time. Yet if ‘making,’ or any non-speech 
action, is excluded from politics, as Arendt claims it is, how can power be maintained? A 
politics based exclusively on power relies to an unreasonable extent on cooperation, within a 
system that operates through difference and disagreement, rooted in individual action. It is to 
Arendt’s work on Rome that we must look for an alternative to a pure action-based politics, 
and one that incorporates a notion of ‘making’ that is far more political than is often believed 
to be the case.  
 
4 
 
It was the Romans, not the Greeks, to whom Arendt refers as ‘perhaps the most political 
people we have known.’43 Rome appears as a better exemplar of politics as a whole, than 
Greece does. Yet this has rarely been recognised. As Hammer explains, even those who have 
noticed Arendt’s treatment of Rome, ‘have been reluctant to assign conceptual form to 
Roman thinking.’44 But the conceptual form of Arendt’s thought on Rome offers a new 
perspective on her political thought, answering the question of how a political system can 
both embody action, whilst also enforcing the structural conditions for action. 
 
‘The polis was for the Greeks,’ she writes, ‘as the res publica was for the Romans, 
first of all their guarantee against the futility of individual life.’45 But the success of this 
guarantee differed drastically, as evidenced by Rome’s longevity. For Arendt, this durability 
                                                             
43 Ibid., 7. 
44 Hammer, ‘Hannah Arendt and Roman Political Thought,’ 125.  
45 Arendt, The Human Condition, 56. 
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was a result of the Romans’ superior political understanding and implementation of politics. 
She speaks, often, of the Romans’ ‘extraordinary political sense,’ their ‘political genius,’ and 
their deep understanding of political relationships, over and above, and in contrast to, the 
Greeks.46  
 
The Romans succeeded, to a greater extent, and for a longer period of time, to 
maintain the political space of action. This success was due, Arendt believes, to their 
understanding and positioning of legislation and foundation in politics, namely how these 
activities became distinctly political in nature rather than prepolitical or extra-political. It is 
this that Arendt speaks of as the political genius of Rome.47 While Arendt praises the Romans 
for developing ‘common sense’ into ‘the highest criterion in the management of public-
political affairs,’ in the same breath she praises foundation, or tradition, for its stabilising 
quality.48 Indeed, she writes, ‘the genius of Roman politics – not only according to Virgil but, 
generally, according to Roman self-interpretation – lay in the very principles which attend the 
legendary foundation of the city.’49 And this authority, she argues, ‘resting on a foundation in 
the past as its unshaken cornerstone, gave the world the permanence and durability which 
humans need because they are mortals.’50 She thus positions Rome as a polity based upon the 
power of the people, whilst at the same time, one whose legislation is in some sense fixed but 
also part of the political process itself. This not only differs sharply from her portrait of the 
polis but from her understanding of politics more generally, as it has beee understood. The 
res publica managed to unite permanence with action and power, strengthening the political 
                                                             
46 Ibid., 59, 195; Arendt, ‘Introduction into Politics,’ 178-181. 
47 Arendt, The Human Condition, 195. 
48 Hannah Arendt, ‘The Tradition of Political Thought,’ in The Promise of Politics, ed. Jerome Kohn 
(New York: Schocken Books, 2005), 42. 
49 Arendt, On Revolution, 210. 
50 Hannah Arendt, ‘What is Authority?’ in Between Past and Future, ed. J. Kohn (London: Penguin, 
2006), 94-5. 
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space without constricting it. And the key to understanding this lies in Arendt’s 
conceptualisation of tradition and the way in which tradition, as an interpretation of 
foundation, came together with power and action to underpin the political authority of Roman 
legislation.  
 
The Romans, Arendt writes, ‘invented’ tradition, in the sense that they were the first 
to incorporate the principle of the sacredness of their city’s foundation, and the necessity of 
its continued integrity in the res publica, into their political self-understanding. The centrality 
of the Roman foundation resulted in an understanding of political action as the preservation 
of that foundation. But Roman tradition is not merely a static preservation of the past, but 
enacted through ‘augmentation.’ Tradition kept the foundations alive in the continual re-
creation of the past in the present through, for example, the retelling of histories. Hammer 
writes that for Arendt, ‘this notion of a coincidence of foundation and preservation by virtue 
of augmentation...was deeply rooted in the Roman spirit and could be read from almost every 
page of Roman history.’51  
 
The ‘making’ of the world in this sense occurs primarily through the preservation of 
past action through the written word, rather than the construction by a law-giver of a future 
political world. Instead of the creation of the political space being understood as the activity 
of a legislator projecting forward, fixing legislation and the borders of the political space into 
the future, the Romans understood the creation of the political space to be an active process 
of augmenting a sacred foundation. It was political, because it rested on action and power, 
and durable because it was linked to a particular understanding of the past, and the role of the 
past in the present. In this way, the continual re-creation and stabilisation of the political 
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sphere could be enacted. The foundation acted as a limiting institution to counter the agonal, 
destabilising nature of action, whilst still permitting change and thus a connection to power, 
the driving force of politics. 
 
For Arendt, the example of Rome shows that politics should be considered as a 
relationship between structure and action, constructed in such a way that the actions of the 
political space ought to enable the continual evolution of that space, without destroying it 
altogether. Without such an understanding of politics, Athens was unable to incorporate 
political change into the political space itself. In Rome, even the foundation of the city was 
seen as a continuation of the true beginning, Arendt observes. In the Roman historical 
narrative, Rome ‘was the resurgence of Troy and the reestablishment of some city-state that 
had existed before and of which the thread of continuity and tradition never had broken.’52 
This gave an aspect of stability and continuity to Roman politics which was lacking in the 
polis, where the stabilising factors of legislation were outside politics, and politics itself was 
dominated to a greater, and ultimately unsustainable extent, by individualistic action. The 
past became a part of the living tradition of Roman politics: the ‘common sense’ of the 
Republican political sphere nurtured tradition, while tradition bounded the instability of 
action behind the political shared world. There is something unique about tradition which, 
unlike institutions of rule, does not deny action, but mitigates its more dangerous aspects, 
because it contains or limits action, but without enforcing absolute rules.  
 
5 
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Whereas the key distinction in Arendt’s analysis of the politics of the polis and the res 
publica – and particularly her more positive appraisal of the res publica – was between their 
respective systems of legislation, this has important implications for her portrayal of violence 
in the two polities. It is well-known that Arendt, writing through the Cold War, the Vietnam 
War and in the shadow of the threat of nuclear war, sought to distinguish violence from 
politics, and extensively and thoroughly criticised the supposed interchangeability of violence 
and politics. However, in these ancient examples, the relationship between violence and 
politics – the potential for a legitimately ‘political’ violence – appears in quite a different 
light. (The important question of context will be returned to at the end of this paper with 
respect to the claims I make here.)  
 
The difference between Greek law or nomos, and Roman law or lex, illustrates the 
way in which violence plays a very different role in the understanding, and practice, of the 
political in Greece and Rome. Legislation understood to be outside politics or prepolitical, 
where it forms the ‘wall-like law,’ is the specifically Greek notion.53 Legislative change is not 
within the remit of the citizens, or indeed any institution of the polis. The Roman 
understanding of legislation, by contrast, is that it neither forms the whole of politics, nor is 
strictly prepolitical. The Roman sense of lex corresponds to Montesquieu’s ‘rapports,’ Arendt 
argues, ‘the “rules” or régles which determine the government of a world and without which 
a world would not exist at all…the relations which exist and preserve different realms of 
being.’54 As part of tradition, legislation helps to create the ‘world’ or political space that 
enables and stabilises action. Legislation connects with tradition through ‘augmentation,’ and 
thus is an act of ‘making’ in a limited sense. But importantly, this idea of legislation is not 
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conceptualised as a boundary around the political space, but is understood in terms of a 
structure of relationships between people in a political community and so is positioned within 
politics. In fact, Arendt argues, ‘the Roman politicization of the space between peoples marks 
the beginning of the Western world – indeed, it first created the Western world as world.’55 
Unlike nomos, which bound politics to a small, intense field of action, Roman lex opened up 
the political space to change. 
 
The political benefit of understanding law as a set of malleable relationships, rather 
than a fixed boundary structure, is most apparent in the Roman ability to expand their 
political territory through war and treaty making. Roman political expansionism – 
incorporating within it, invariably, the aspect of (often extreme) violence – was simply not a 
possibility open to the Greeks. While the Athenians could aggrandize themselves through 
war, winning glory and tribute, they could not incorporate their conquests into their polity as 
the Romans did. The fixed Greek territorial state, the legislature, and the citizen body, could 
not change as circumstance demanded. To counter political decline, the Greek philosophers 
looked to a method of stabilising politics that they understood to be outside politics – in the 
realm of abstract thought, and its concept of ‘the good,’ to bring order to chaos – but the 
Romans reshaped politics itself through their innovative use of legislation as a way of 
extending politics through post-conflict treaties.  
 
As Patricia Owens writes, Arendt ‘condemned the ancient Greeks for building their 
polis around the ideals of agonistic contest whilst simultaneously excluding all legal and 
political recognition of the “barbarians” outside…The Romans by contrast, endowed the 
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“other” with a legally recognized status.’56 Roman politics was, in fact, rooted in this notion 
of alliance between intrinsically different peoples. ‘The Roman Republic, resting itself upon 
the perpetual alliance between patricians and plebeians,’ writes Arendt, ‘used the instrument 
of leges chiefly for treaties and for ruling the provinces and communities which belonged to 
the Roman system of alliances, that is, to the ever-extending group of Roman socii, who 
formed the societas Romana.’57 As Owens explains, the relational concept of lex is therefore 
considered to be superior to Greek nomos by Arendt, because it enables the law to flex in 
order to incorporate new political realities (arrived at through warfare), offering “some 
stability and form to what would otherwise seem so fleeting and transient, political words and 
action.’58 This is what Owens means when she says that the violence of warfare is 
‘constitutively outside’ of politics.59 
  
Where the legislator and politics are understood in the Greek mind as two opposing 
poles, representing the unchanging past and the mortal sphere of agonism and chaos, Roman 
lex and the res publica are both understood to be public things open to change. Legislation, 
like politics, is a system of relationships between people, and political space emerges as a 
result of these relationships. The Romans brought legislation together with power, enabling 
the constant creation and recreation of the res publica, thus merging action and durability 
through tradition: the Roman ‘political genius.’  
 
Yet in her praise for the Roman treaty system, and underlying explanation of how lex 
enables the transformation of violence into politics – and thus creates a legitimate 
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relationship, or route, between one and the other – that is definitively excluded by nomos, 
Arendt illustrates how violence may indeed be incorporated into politics in a positive sense. It 
is only in Roman antiquity, she writes, not Greece, where we find the first attempts to justify 
war, since, for the Greeks, war was outside the political it did not require justification.60 For 
most of history since then, she writes, (but not today) ‘war was indeed the continuation of 
politics by other means.’61 
 
But the Roman justification of violence in foreign affairs was not simply an 
instrumental means of legitimising warfare, but inseparable from the Roman understanding of 
politics. The ‘ambition of Rome was not to subject the whole world to Roman power and 
imperium, but to throw the Roman system of alliances over all countries of the earth,’ Arendt 
writes – in short, to create a world republic, not simply a dominion.62 And at the root of this 
belief that violence actively produces a political world, is the Roman people’s own history. 
Roman lex and its system of international treaties, originated, she suggests in the fact that the 
populus Romanus ‘owed its existence to such a war-born partnership, namely, to the alliance 
between patricians and plebeians, whose internal civil strife was concluded through the 
famous laws of the Twelve Tables.’63 The Roman system of internal legislation and foreign 
treaty-making, and indeed their whole political tradition, is premised upon a belief that 
violence may be transformed into genuine politics. And this, apparently, not only is of little 
concern to Arendt, but is in fact praised by her. 
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A note of historical scepticism must be sounded here. Arendt’s depiction of violence 
in Rome unquestionably underplays the severity and frequency of mob violence, particularly 
in the late Republic, and the influence of this extra-legal violence on Roman politics. The 
treaty between patrician and plebs, on which she bases the principle of lex, was only ever 
tenuous and unsteady, with both sides utilising violence for their own interests. Arendt had, 
in this respect, as more broadly, a willingness to overlook or accept certain forms of violence 
in society – as long as it does not interfere with ‘politics’ – that would be considered 
extraordinarily violent by any normal standards. And in the Roman case she is, unfortunately, 
largely silent on what the implications of this are for either the legitimacy or stability of the 
political sphere. As to whether this is a deliberate omission or mere historical inaccuracy, 
given the frequency of violence within the later Roman Republic, and that Arendt had, as a 
younger woman, extensively studied the histories of both Greece and Rome, makes this less 
likely to be inaccuracy than pointed omission. Certainly, in the context of the ‘pact’ between 
plebs and patricians in which she roots the legitimisation of political violence within the 
Republic, this is problematic, and the failure to deal with this can only be considered a 
weakness in her argument. Furthermore, the charged, often violent relationship between the 
rich and poor, does not accord well with the optimistic political image of Rome which she 
offers: the bastion of political continuity and stability.  
 
Yet Arendt does offer us something which allows us to frame her claims about 
political violence more clearly: the example of Carthage. The brutal destruction of Carthage 
by the Romans in the second century BC is distinguished by its extreme and totalising 
violence, and the absence of any attempt by Rome to ‘politicise’ Carthage by forming an 
alliance with it. Indeed, our modern ‘total wars,’ Arendt writes, are no more than a ‘reversion 
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of warfare to the days when the Romans wiped Carthage off the face of the earth.’64 This is – 
now as then – no less than one of the few ‘mortal sins’ of politics, she writes, because it 
eradicates both a whole people, and a constitution, ‘both of which harbour the possibility – 
and in the constitution’s case, the intention – of being immortal.’65 Thus Carthage, as a total 
war, is an example of the ‘overstepping of the limits inherent in violent action.’66 It oversteps 
the limits of politics, because ‘the hostile encounter that is part of conflict can remain an 
encounter between people only if the battle is broken off before the destruction of the 
vanquished and a different kind of encounter arises out of battle.’67  
 
And yet, while this necessarily falls outside any legitimate form of relationship 
between violence and politics, Carthage was, Arendt claims, neither a negation of the general 
Roman principle of treaty, nor was it avoidable. Carthage is portrayed, by Arendt, following 
the Romans, as a ‘government that never kept its word and never forgave,’ and which thus 
could not be dealt with through political alliance (even following defeat in war). It ‘embodied 
an anti-Roman political principle against which Roman statesmanship was powerless and 
would have destroyed Rome had not Rome destroyed it first.’68 Carthage represents not 
politics, but brutal necessity, for Arendt, highlighting the desperate importance of genuine 
politics enabling peoples to escape – sometimes – the realm of always-violent necessity. 
Politics is not a solution for all worldly threats, not is politics present in all state-enacted 
violence. Yet, for Arendt, the Roman approach to understanding the place of violence in 
public life was both definitively political and a valuable force for the Republic.  
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6 
 
I do not want to claim that the description of politics, and its relationship with violence, that 
is offered in Arendt’s portrayal of the ancient world is at odds with the rest of her work. Quite 
the opposite is true: the highly abstracted concepts laid out within ‘On Violence’ must be 
understood together with the more complex analysis of politics, as it is practiced in the far-
from-ideal real world, to fully grasp the claims Arendt is making about how politics and 
violence relate. Of particular importance, in this respect, in Arendt’s writings on Rome, and 
absent if one simply understands her work as an idealisation of Greece, is the insight that 
politics, although defined by action, is not exclusively action, but also relies upon a human 
artifice created by men through certain kinds of political fabrication.  
 
Her analysis of Roman politics emphasises the importance of a counterpart to action 
in politics, understood as tradition and legislation, enacting a continual making and remaking 
of the political world, including through acts of violence. Any political world is more than 
intangible ‘common sense,’ important though that is. Tradition must be embodied within the 
common sense if it is to influence the actions of the community, by framing which actions are 
seen to be legitimate according to the founding principles. But it is also part of an 
institutional and cultural fabricated world. The sustaining of the past in the present, and for 
the present, must be in part entrenched in a physical world if it is not to suffer the same 
problems of discontinuity and spontaneous change inherent in action. Physical things are 
required to ‘give the human artifice the stability without which it could never be a reliable 
home for men,’ Arendt states. ‘The man-made world of things, the human artifice erected by 
homo faber, becomes a home for mortal men, whose stability will endure and outlast the 
ever-changing moment of their lives and actions.’ Therefore, she continues,  
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acting and speaking men need the help of homo faber in his highest capacity, that is, the 
help of the artists, of poets and historiographers, of monument-builders or writers, 
because without them, the only product of their activity, the story they enact and tell, 
would not survive at all.69  
 
Thus, homo faber, ‘in his highest capacity’ – through work that involves telling the stories of 
action – is required for a political entity to transcend any particular time, and sustain itself 
over longer periods. For Arendt, the writer, poet, historian, monument maker – and, we might 
add, legislator – are integral to the stabilisation of the human artifice by establishing 
understanding of the various concepts and categories created through lived experience. This 
understanding of ‘work,’ then, connects to her conception of tradition, in at least two 
important respects. First, the examples Arendt offers of the politically relevant productive 
aspect of the homo faber are deeply historical: from monument building, to historiography, to 
poets in the form of heroic storytellers, all are artists who seek to preserve history for the 
future, framing events as exemplary experiences. Secondly, the manner in which this comes 
about closely resembles the dual aspect of tradition for Arendt: being both a ‘fixing’ of 
action; whilst also relying on its integration with action to maintain its authority.  
 
Within the production of political works, there is a spectrum of types of productive 
activity, either more or less closely connected to action. Physical art has a relative 
permanence of character; closer to a utilitarian ‘making’ than some other forms of culture-
production.70 At the other extreme is poetry, in which ‘remembrance, Mnēmosynē, the mother 
of the muses, is directly transformed into memory.’ However, she continues, ‘of all things of 
                                                             
69 Ibid., 173. 
70 Ibid., 168. 
 
 27 
 
thought, poetry is closest to thought, and a poem is less a thing than any other work of art; yet 
even a poem…will eventually be “made,” that is, written down and transformed into tangible 
thing.’71 But in all forms, it is meaningful language that is made durable, speech action 
‘fixed’ in memory, but open to interpretation. These forms of art are the medium through 
which tradition, an attitude of sanctity towards the past, is entrenched in a society over time, 
and as such tradition is as much part of the world of homo faber – albeit at its most political 
extreme – as it is of action and politics. Tradition straddles the two worlds of work and action 
in a way that is absolutely necessary to its existence. The balance, however, is a fine one. 
When tradition is seen as a dialogue between past and present it brings action and durability 
together. Too much emphasis on the past, and one risks limiting free action, too much on the 
present, and politics falls into the problem experienced in the polis of the instability of 
unrestricted natality. Hence tradition is envisaged by Arendt in its Roman guise as a living re-
creation of the past: the use of the past and its meanings and exemplars in the context of the 
present, not just as an authority set in stone, but a pragmatic and valuable political resource. 
 
Thus, while some argue, as Tsao does, argue that Arendt criticises the Greeks because 
they conflated making and action, in fact, the problem was that they possessed a flawed 
understanding of the role of ‘making’ in politics. Instead Arendt appeals to an idea of making 
which took place in Roman politics through tradition and legislation. This differs from the 
Greeks in terms of the perception of time and the presence of power. Legislation is not seen 
to ‘make the future,’ but preserve and augment the principles of the past. The original root, 
Arendt writes, of the term authority, ‘derives from the verb augere, “augment,” and what 
authority or those in authority constantly augment is the foundation.’72 In this sense, power is 
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embodied within the legislative activity whilst maintaining a sense of tradition, or the sanctity 
of the past. It is an active engagement with the past in the present, as opposed to the passive 
involvement of the Greeks in their political submission to the legislator of the past. 
 
The Roman political world is thus comprised of power, action, and, in a limited sense: 
‘work.’ And this latter activity is deeply violent: ‘an element of violence is inevitably 
inherent in all activities of making, fabricating, and producing.’73 For Arendt, making is a 
process of construction, but it is also, as a process of change, a kind of destruction. This is 
where violence is inevitable in the making process. It clears a space for the new by rejecting 
and destroying the old. Human action, Arendt points out, does not start ‘ab ovo, to create ex 
nihilo. In order to make room for one’s own action, something that was there before must be 
removed or destroyed.’74 Given that work is, in some sense, a part of the political sphere, a 
sphere defined by its commitment to action, its relationship to politics requires further 
clarification. Even if violent work is in aid of the political, or even necessary for the political, 
it still follows the logic of work. Hence, Arendt states, ‘the law produces the arena within 
which politics occurs, and contains in itself the violent force inherent in all production.’75 
However, political violence must be distinguished from the primal violence of nature, against 
which the political acts as a safeguard. The ‘element of violation and violence is present in all 
fabrication,’ Arendt writes, ‘and homo faber...has always been a destroyer of nature...[Yet] 
the experience of this violence is the most elemental experience of human strength and, 
therefore, the very opposite of the painful, exhausting effort experienced in sheer labor.’76 
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Arendt’s discussion of Rome shows – although it is not the primary intention of her 
work on this topic – that the violence of work is not inherently anti-political. As she writes, 
‘neither violence nor power is a natural phenomenon, that is, a manifestation of the life 
process; they belong to the political realm of human affairs whose essentially human quality 
is guaranteed by man’s faculty of action, the ability to begin.’77 It is only when violence 
becomes disengaged from power, from the primacy of action, that it becomes anti-political. 
Conceptually this is what Arendt describes in ‘On Violence,’ and in practice, this excess and 
misunderstanding of violence is what she believes has occurred in most of the modern 
sovereign political systems she criticises. Yet when conjoined with a system of legislation 
that enables the violence of ‘making’ to be transformed, and thus incorporated, into a new 
political world, violence becomes, while still not an implicitly political action, an act that 
may be described as a part of a recognisably political space of action. Politics, then, 
transcends the strict boundaries laid out in The Human Condition, moving beyond action 
alone.  
 
7 
 
David Bates, in his article on Arendt’s ‘imperial republic’ writes: ‘Arendt’s idiosyncratic and 
celebrated effort to insulate the space of the “political” in fact emerged out of intense 
reflections on the nature of warfare in the challenging new context of the nuclear revolution 
and the Cold War.’ As such, he claims, ‘Arendt’s move toward the abstract existential 
republicanism developed in her classic works of political theory…can only be properly 
understood in relation to her initial theorization of “omnicidal” warfare and the consequent 
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invalidation of all “traditional” political concepts.’78 Such a position would appear to render 
Arendt’s discussion of war and violence in the ancient Greek and Roman worlds irrelevant to 
modernity.  
 
Certainly, the context in which Arendt understood herself to be writing affects how 
directly we might apply her work on Rome and Greece to the modern world. For her, the 
twentieth century differed from the centuries preceding it in two connected ways. First, the 
emergence of total wars of attrition, with no distinction made between civilians and military 
targets, marked out the twentieth century as something essentially different, a historical 
movement entrenched by the emergence of nuclear weapons (the ‘omnicidal warfare’ Bates 
refers to). Secondly, as Bates also points out, the twentieth century was for Arendt the era in 
which ‘traditional’ ethical and political values had finally been wholly undermined, not least, 
amongst those traditions, the limitations on violence formerly imposed by political norms. 
Arendt’s work on violence was, unquestionably, shaped by these considerations. The 
increasingly imperial character of the American Republic also pressed heavily on Arendt’s 
mind. Bates writes that, while in the 1950s, Arendt had been ‘open to thinking about the 
constitutive relationship between republican law and imperial war,’ by the 1970s, she 
believed American imperialism merely threatened republican values. ‘She had no time, it 
seems, for any conceptualization of the modern “imperial republic” that might inspire a new 
principle of politics that would limit war, establish legal relations, and “protect human 
dignity.”’79  
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However, the apparently clear division between, first, the ancient and modern worlds, 
and secondly, Arendt’s early and later work, are not as conclusive as this analysis suggests. In 
her 1951 work, The Origins of Totalitarianism, she describes imperialism as one of the great 
threats to human civilisation and indeed a fundamental means by which political values had 
been undermined, by the brutal imperialist use and acceptance of violence in their activities. 
America’s hegemonic ambitions and heavy-handed actions across the globe over the 1960s 
and 1970s were a source of deep concern to Arendt. But it is not the case that her attitude to 
warfare changed as a result of American activities. In the 1950s, she considered the 
contemporary use of imperial warfare to be unjustifiable, despite her support of imperial 
elements in Roman warfare in the same period of her work. The differences that appear in her 
work are, instead, due to the shape of the modern polity and its ideology, not a change in 
Arendt’s opinions on this, as will be set out over the following paragraphs. 
 
For Arendt, total war is not, as already noted, a novel phenomenon in history, 
although it is new to recent, Western history. She directly relates the total wars of the 
twentieth century to Rome’s destruction of Carthage, describing total war not as a historically 
original phenomenon, but a ‘reversion’ to the days when Rome ‘wiped Carthage off the face 
of the earth.’80 That is, whilst modern warfare is an essentially non-political activity, such 
activities are not inherently at odds with other forms of violence – that are more positively 
political, and thereby justifiable – existing at the same time, even enacted by the same people, 
as in the case of the Romans. The destruction of Carthage did not undermine the more 
general principle of alliance. The invention of modern techniques of destruction has made 
total war more rapid, particularly in the case of nuclear war, and this is a far from 
unsubstantial development in Arendt’s view. But her explicit correspondence between 
                                                             
80 Arendt, On Revolution, 14-5. 
 32 
 
Carthage and the wars of the twentieth century reveal that this does not mark a qualitative 
shift in the nature of ‘total war’ which is in either case the destruction of ‘worlds’ and whole 
peoples.  
 
What is far more concerning, and what does mark out a qualitative difference between 
Roman politics and modern politics is the loss of political values and the ensuing chaos of the 
modern post-traditional situation. In particular, it is the conflation of violence with politics 
that constitutes a more significant and disturbing difference for Arendt. Unlike for the 
Romans, who understood that the nature of the political was fundamentally action and power, 
contemporary political actors believe themselves to be undertaking politics when they carry 
out violent acts without any basis of acting for or within a genuinely political world. It is this 
loss of action, or rather, an understanding of the role action plays in politics, that is 
problematic. ‘Only the modern age’s conviction that man…is primarily homo faber and not 
an animal rationale, brought forth the much older implications of violence inherent in all 
interpretations of the realm of human affairs as a sphere of making,’ Arendt writes. ‘Marx’s 
dictum that “violence is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one,” that is, of 
all change in history and politics, only sums up the conviction of the whole modern age and 
draws the consequences of its innermost belief that history is “made” by men as nature is 
“made” by God.’81  
 
By contrast, in the Roman system of politics, where ‘making’ was combined with an 
understanding of politics as action, and limited to ‘augmentation’ of the past, as opposed to a 
wholly revolutionary remaking of the future, a certain degree of violence was perfectly 
permissible in political terms, and even necessary. When ‘making’ supersedes action, politics 
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is lost, and the violence that emerges is without political justification. It is, of course, against 
this background that Arendt writes so vehemently against violence, in the sense in which it is 
associated with politics in a post-Marx era, where history and politics is believed to be 
‘made’ by men, that is, when the future is determined in advance, through whatever 
invariably violent means are necessary. For Arendt, the recovery of action in politics is 
paramount if we are to reverse this tendency in our politics. Yet, it should not be forgotten 
that action, as Rome shows, is not the only important aspect of politics, and Arendt’s 
rejection of violence in the modern world, does not equate to the necessary rejection of 
violence in all political situations, including, potentially, in our political future. Indeed, in 
order to protect a new political tradition, the Roman example shows that a degree of violence 
may be considered justifiable and required for political stability. Of course, none of this is 
possible unless genuine politics is recovered. But violence – some forms of violence – may 
be a part of that genuinely political framework.  
 
Arendt is not seeking to justify violence in political terms in her analysis of Greece 
and Rome, but it is implicit in her claims about the politics of these two worlds. The 
comparison offered here suggests that, instead of drawing a sharp line between violence and 
politics, in truth there is a justified political connection between violent acts and political acts 
in Arendt’s work. Violence does not explicitly exclude politics but the political sphere must 
draw on, as its foundation, action and power, if it is to be considered legitimate. Today, it is 
the case that violence is politically inexcusable for Arendt, but this is not due to technical 
considerations of the means of violence, but the fact that for Arendt, true politics – the only 
justifying factor for violence – is absent in the world, and has been replaced by a 
misconception of violence as politics itself.  
 
